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EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOL*
Leo A. Huard**
I
When I was a law student, quite a few years ago, my law school
had no course directed toward the development of a sense of professional
responsibility in its students. We had a thirty class hour course in
Jurisprudence and, shortly before graduation, were exposed to five lectures
based upon the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association. This, our common sense, the sum of our pre-legal education
and experience, and our legal education itself was assumed to prepare
us adequately to resist unethical temptations and to meet responsibly the
problems of one of man's most ancient and difficult callings, the practice
of law.
This sketchy preparation was not unique. Very few law schools
offejed more and several offered nothing at all. The normal curriculum
was the case method of study, accidentally centered upon those courses
which appeared with the greatest frequency in state bar examinations.
Little attention was given to the so called perspective courses, e.g.,
International Law, Comparative Law, Jurisprudence, Legal Profession, on
the one hand and the "skill" courses, e.g., drafting, trial preparation,
practice court, counselling, on the other. The first were usually elective
and the second too few and ordinarily taught in a singularly uninspired
manner by practicing non-teachers; a situation even more shocking than
having law taught by teaching non-practitioners.
It can only be by the operation of Divine Mercy that this system
did produce a very large number of ethical, professionally responsible
lawyers. All too often, however, the best product was an accomplished
craftsman, ethically numb and totally unaware that he was a member of
a profession and that, as such, he was bound to certain obligations. The
worst product is one we have all seen, a slick, skilled legal mechanic,
without conscience and ever ready to take any advantage, fair or unfair.
Usually, he justifies his conduct as a requirement of client loyalty. It is
he who has created the unflattering popular image of the lawyer as a
shyster who bends the law to save guilty clients. Besides being an insult
to the rest of us, this image may also account, in part, for the fact that
* Address delivered at the Annual Dinner of the St. Thomas More Society of San
Francisco and the East Bay, San Francisco, California, October 18, 1961.
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara Law School; Member
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our American law schools are not attracting a fair share of the best
college students in competition with the sciences and medicine. The good
students are going elsewhere.
In the years since my legal education began, particularly in the last
several years, the law schools (encouraged by some lawyers) have de-
veloped an almost painful awareness of their shortcomings in professional
responsibility education. They now have engaged in a great common
resolve to redress this terrible wrong. During roughly the same period,
practicing lawyers (encouraged by some legal educators) have continued
their shrill, although occasional, insistence on more skills and craft training
in the law schools. There are elements of inconsistency in the two
approaches based upon the limited time available for a legal education.
My purpose is briefly to explore this seeming inconsistency. I hope
to show also that the Catholic law school has a special role in modern
legal education.
II
Professional responsibility is first a recognition that the practice of
law is essentially a public calling. In every act he performs, the lawyer
has two obligations, two duties. He is responsible to his client. This is a
private obligation. He is also, and equally, responsible to the community,
the state and the nation. This is a public obligation. Very frequently, per-
haps usually, his public duty is adequately met by the discharge of his
private duty. To put it another way, the obligation to the public interest is
fulfilled by carrying out a specific task for a particular client honorably
and well. Frequently, however, public interest requires action which
does not coincide with a private task. It is then that the responsible
lawyer assists in legal aid work, serves on bar association committees,
supports "good government" groups and does myriad other things which
his education and skill obligate him to do as a matter of professional
honor. Professional responsibility may even call for participation in
political activity and in government service in extreme situations.
It must be obvious that in both private and public obligations, the
lawyer's professional responsibility transcends mere legal ethics. In the
terms of our reference, it may even be possible for a lawyer to be
ethical but professionally irresponsible in the sense that he looks upon
his calling as imposing no greater obligations than a craft or a trade.
Let me clarify this by illustrations drawn from private law practice.
In a discussion of trial technique before a bar association group,
Mr. A included in his description of technique such matters as deliberate
harassment of the judge by groundless objections made in the presence
of the jury; quickly uttered questions and comment of an improper or
inadmissible nature, followed by profuse apologies to the court, again in
the presence of the jury; and various petty discourtesies which it seems
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unnecessary to spell out here. Mr. A pointed out, ia the manner of one
explaining Blackstone, that these tactics, when skillfully carried out, often
provoked the judge to an outbtlrst of temper which favorably disposed
the jury toward A's cause. Mr. A was severely taken to task by one
of his audience who pointed out that the members of the host bar
association were able to distinguish between technique and trickery.
Is Mr. A's "technique" professionally responsible conduct? Obviously,
in the measure in which it is known, it adversely affects the public image
of the lawyer and, more seriously perhaps, it makes a very strong
impression on law students to whose attention such matters inevitably
come. Young people admire success uncritically. Their knowledge is
superficial and their experience is slight. For this reason, they tend to
applaud an advocate's trick as well as an advocate's skill and to equate
trickery with technique. Does a lawyer's professional responsibility extend
to a forbearance from conduct which will have a harmful effect on
fledglings in the profession? Please note that this sort of unprofessional
conduct probably does not involve a violation of ethics in the usually
accepted sense of that term.
Some time ago, I discussed the practice of law with two young
lawyers, one the product of a Catholic law school, the other of a non-
sectarian law school. I suggested to them that a lawyer who used a
dishonest defense-specifically, perjured testiniony-in order to secure the
acquittal of his client, committed a breach of professional ethics and was
professionally irresponsible as well. They both indignantly rejected my
suggestion stoutly maintaining that "anything goes" in the defense of a
client. Perhaps they were conditioned by a law review article of some
ten years ago asserting that the lawyer had a duty to tell an occasional
lie for his client and. sometimes to refuse to disclose facts to the court in
his client's defense.1 In effect, this article said that a man can be too
honest, too upright to be a really good lawyer.2 Conversely, a thoroughly
honest man cannot be a very effective lawyer. I reject this sort of thinking
completely, but I submit it for your consideration as a not infrequent
state of affairs. Does this meet your concept of legal ethics? Of pro-
fessional responsibility?
Let me pose a somewhat closer question. My field is administrative
law and as you know it is sometimes said that this is the only area of
law in which the questions and problems remain the same, but the
answers are constantly changed. This is a gross calumny, but it is true
that our procedures tend to be ambiguous and our processes amorphous.
1 Curtis, The Ethics of Adv'ocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 6-13 (1951); reprinted,
TRUMBULL, MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. (Prentice-Hall,
Inc. 1957), 201, 204-210.




This shifting operational climate creates great opportunities for continu-
ances and other delays. I remember an attorney who boasted that his
dilatory tactics before a federal commission--always pursued in the guise
of protecting public interest-saved his clients one million dollars per
trial day. This was quite literally true since he represented an association
composed of virtually all the manufacturers of the commodity involved.
This man would have been astonished had his conduct been described
as unethical or irresponsible. You can all give similar examples of abuse
(misuse?) of legal process from your own observations. They occur in
court as well as before commissions. Can this be a mark of lack of
professional responsibility when used to protect a client at the expense
of the public interest? This is a difficult question. All questions in the
area of legal ethics and professional responsibility are prickly and
hard to handle.
I submit that the heart of our problem is the undue emphasis which
the legal profession has always placed on client loyalty. We have over-
stressed loyalty to the client and understressed loyalty to the law. At
the risk of carrying coals to Newcastle, I am going to point to some
fundamental concepts applicable to all of us.
The California State Bar Act contains one section dealing with the
duty of an attorney and it states that; (a) an attorney must support the
Constitution and the laws of the United States and of this State; (b) he
must maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
(c) he must counsel or maintain such actions only as appear to him legal
or just, save the defense of a person charged with a public offense. The
next subsection is particularly strong medicine. It holds that an attorney
has the duty to employ "for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him means only as are consistent with truth and never
to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law."
It seems clear that the State Bar Act contemplates support of the
law before support of the client. The Rules of Professional Conduct
approved by the California Supreme Court are silent on this point,4 but
they do commend the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association 5
to the members of the State Bar with respect to matters not specified in
the Rules.
Canon five holds that in the defense of criminals "the lawyer is
bound by all fair and honorable means to present every defense that the
3 California State Bar Act, section 6068 (a-d). This and all other references to the
California State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics of the American Bar Association are taken from a pamphlet published
by the State Bar of California and amended to November 1, 1960. This will avoid a
proliferation of uninformative footnotes.
4 The Rules are silent on many points. They have been described as the "thou-
shalt-nots" of the legal profession, i.e., the minimum requirements.
5 As contained in the pamphlet referred to supra note 3, beginning at p. 39.
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law of the land permits. .. " Canon fifteen is entitled "How Far a
Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client's Cause." It begins by reciting
that nothing is more harmful to our profession than "the false claim,
often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions,
that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to
succeed in winning his client's cause." The lawyer owes entire devotion
to his client to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from him save
by the rules of law legally applied. In court, the client is entitled to the
benefit of every remedy and defense authorized by the law of the land.
But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within, and not without
the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit,
much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of
law or any manner of fraud or chicane. (Canon 15, emphasis
supplied).
The twenty-second canon enjoins upon us candor and fairness in
dealing with witnesses, with the court and with each other. Canon
thirty-two admonishes us that, in the last analysis, our duty calls for
loyalty to the law whose ministers we are and respect for the judicial
office which we are bound to uphold.
Two things are immediately apparent. First, the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics of the American Bar Association cover matters I have
included under professional responsibility as well as ethics in the classical
sense. These Canons were adopted in 1908,6 so education for pro-
fessional responsibility is making a rather late start. Second, statutory
law and the canons join in placing real strictures on client loyalty. The
lawyer's first loyalty is to the law and his first duty is to support and
maintain the law and the courts.
It is sometimes said that the language of the Act and of the Canons
is ambiguous.7 I do not find it so and I reject the notion that words such
as law, respect, justice, truth, honorable and fair, or artifice, false and
disloyalty are words that a lawyer cannot understand and that they
represent concepts he cannot appreciate.
III
In the present state of our profession, all law schools must single-
mindedly direct their efforts to education for professional responsibility.
We cannot afford to do otherwise! It seems impractical, however, to
extend the law school curriculum beyond the present three years, and
it is clearly impossible to drop the traditional core courses such as Con-
tracts, Torts and the other cherished oldsters. The inflexibility of time
This complaint is often heard from lawyers, law professors and law students.
6 Supra note 3 at 39, footnote. The first thirty-two canons and the recommended oath
were adopted by the American Bar Association on August 27, 1908.
[Vol. 2
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
dictates that something must go, and in this Hobson's choice, the law
schools must drop, or at least not expand the teaching of skills.
The simple reason for this selection is that skills training can be
acquired from bar association educational programs and professional
responsibility education cannot be. Education for professional responsi-
bility can only be administered through a lengthy indoctrination pervading
the entire fabric of academic legal education. The excellent California
Continuing Legal Education of the Bar Program has proven the feas-
ibility of skills teaching after law school education. Law schools and the
organized bar both must recognize that the law schools cannot do an
efficient job of educating a man in all the skills of law practice. The
organized bar must assume part of the task.
American law schools then should concentrate on the traditional
curriculum, buttressed with those subjects and techniques necessary to
develop a high sense of professional responsibility in our law graduates.
As the Report of the 1959 Conference on Legal Education put it, the
law schools must place greater emphasis on the theory of law and less
emphasis on its minutiae.8 Incidentally, the Conference recognized that
the organized bar could best provide the practical instruction necessary
to bridge the gap between law school and law practice.9
What role should Catholic law schools play in this scheme of legal
education? Certainly, they too must bring all their resources to bear on
transmitting to their students a solid grounding in the demands that
professional responsibility will make upon them after graduation.
A few minutes ago reference was made to client loyalty and loyalty
to the law. It is to this aspect of professional responsibility education
that our schools can make their greatest contribution. We can define
loyalty to the law by emphasizing that the law must be founded in
natural justice and good morals. This is the special facility possessed by
the Catholic law school.
The Adviser to the Section on Legal Education of the American Bar
Association has been an astute participant-observer of legal education in
the United States for more than a quarter of a century. He has, on
occasion, made some pithy comment about Church-related schools. The
last such occasion was at a Catholic law school, and there, Dr. Hervey
had this to say:
Some years ago I expressed the thought that the Church-related
law schools of America should be different from secular institu-
tions-that such schools . . . . should consciously synthesize
For a learned discussion of the same situation in Texas practice, see, Sutton, Guidelines
to Professional Responsibility, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 391, 408-4 15 (1961).
8 "The Law Schools Look Ahead," 1959 Conference on Legal Education (Ann
Arbor, Michigan) p. 1.
9 Id. at 5.
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
the Christian precepts with knowledge of the law and with
professional responsibility.' 0
Dr. Hervey points out that law school catalogues disclose little or
no difference between the programs in our various law schools whether
Church-related, public related or independent. He rejects the assertion
that time limitations and bar examination requirements prevent the Church-
related schools from pursuing a different educational program than other
law schools. He states, quite accurately, that every teacher in every law
school can infuse Christian precepts into every law school course."
Dr. Hervey is not a Catholic, but if we introduce "Natural Law" and
".good morals" at appropriate points in his thesis, we will find little to
quarrel with therein. If we took care to analyse all of our courses in terms
of Natural Law and good morals, we would have an excellent basis for
a strong program of education for professional responsibility.
By the very nature of things, Catholic legal education is in the hands
of laymen. Some of these people are Catholic, others are not. Catholic
or non-Catholic, lay persons tend to feel disqualified the moment reference
is made to Natural Law and to morals. They tend to feel that these are
matters for the clergy rather than the lawyer and they are, of course,
partly right. But, if we lose these gifted people because of this feeling,
Catholic legal education will suffer a mortal blow. We, all of us, laymen
and clergy, teachers and practitioners, must join in convincing our lay
teachers that they need not become theologians and moralists in order
to teach in Catholic law schools. They must be made to realize this.
We ask only that they approach the legal problems presented in
their courses from the Natural Law standpoint. Beyond this, they need
only display a willingness to call upon the members of our theology and
philosophy departments. We do not utilize the talents of the able people
in these departments nearly enough and it would be good pedagogy, as
well as good sense, to bring this inter-disciplinary approach to bear upon
education for professional responsibility. Catholic law schools are in a
particularly fine position to relate professional responsibility to the law of
God as well as to the law of man. This is our unique contribution and
we should make haste to fulfill it.
10 Hervey, The Time is at Hand When - Some Personal Observations, p. 1; reprint
of an address at St. Mary's University Law School, San Antonio, Texas, May 11, 1961.
11 Id. at 2.
[Vol. 2
